Strategic union delegation and strike activity

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Strategic union delegation and strike activity

We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the wage outcome in case of surplus-maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage-maximizing delegates, even...

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Article history: Received 6 February 2009 Received in revised form 10 August 2009 Accepted 9 September 2009 Available online 30 September 2009 JEL classification: D71 D72 F53 H11

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d`Economique

سال: 2005

ISSN: 0008-4085,1540-5982

DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00273.x