Strategy-proof Location on a Network
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy-proof Location on a Network
We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents’ single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We ...
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A location function on a finite graph takes a set of most preferred locations (vertices of the graph) for a set of users, and returns a set of locations satisfying conditions meant to please the entire user set as much as possible. A strategyproof location function is one for which it never benefits a user to report a suboptimal preferred location. We introduce four versions of strategy-proof a...
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In the problem of obnoxious facility location, an obnoxious facility is located in an area. To maximize the social welfare, e.g., the sum of distances from all the agents to the facility, we have to get the true locations of each agent. However, each agent may misreport his/her location to stay far away from the obnoxious facility. In this paper, we design strategy-proof mechanisms on locating ...
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Mechanism design for facility location (or selection of alternatives in a metric space) has been studied for decades. While strategy-proof, efficient mechanisms exist for unconstrained, one-dimensional, single-facility problems, guarantees of strategy-proofness and efficiency often break when allowing: (a) multiple dimensions; (b) multiple facilities; or (c) constraints on the feasible placemen...
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This paper is devoted to the location of public facilities in a metric space. Selfish agents are located in this metric space, and their aim is to minimize their own cost, which is the distance from their location to the nearest facility. A central authority has to locate the facilities in the space, but she is ignorant of the true locations of the agents. The agents will therefore report their...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2807