Strategy-proof partitioning
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy-proof partitioning
We consider the problem of choosing a partition of a set of objects by a set of agents. The private information of each agent is a strict ordering over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function chooses a partition given the reported preferences of the agents. We impose a natural restriction on the allowable set of strict orderings over the set of partitions, which we call a...
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We consider the problem of choosing a partition of a set of objects by a set of agents. The private information of each agent is a strict ordering over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function chooses a partition given the reported preferences of the agents. We impose a natural restriction on the allowable set of strict orderings over the set of partitions, which we call a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.004