Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences
We study the possibilities of constructing strategy-proof rules that choose sets of alternatives as a function of agents' preferences over such sets. We consider two restrictions on the domain of individual preferences over sets. Assuming that all singletons are in the range of the rule, we show that only dictatorial rules can be strategy-proof on the larger domain. The smaller domain also allo...
متن کاملStrategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
We qualify a social choice correspondence as resolute when its set valued outcomes are interpreted as mutually compatible alternatives which are altogether chosen. We refer to such sets as “committees” and analyze the manipulability of resolute social choice correspondences which pick fixed size committees. When the domain of preferences over committees is unrestricted, the Gibbard–Satterthwait...
متن کاملStrategy-proof social choice
Many people have helped, directly and indirectly, to write this survey, and my co-authors in particular. Some colleagues and friends read it at some point and provided advise and criticism. They include Weymark. None of them is responsible for the …nal shape and contents of this piece, as I could only very partially take their comments into account. I received very valuable assistance from Conx...
متن کاملCorrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]
Then, f ðR ijk;Ri;Rj;RkÞ is either faj; alg; faj; akg or faj; ak; alg: (Only the first two possibilities are mentioned on page 390). In Case A, also consider the possibility that f ðR ijk;Ri;Rj ;RkÞ 1⁄4 faj; ak; alg: Choose RkADE such that falgPkfaj; algPkfajgPkfak; al ; algPkX for any other set X : The proof that k will manipulate at ðR ijk;Ri; % Rj ;RkÞ via Rk is virtually the same as before....
متن کاملOn strategy-proof social choice under categorization
In this paper, I consider the social choice problems such that (i) the set of alternatives can be categorized into two groups based on some prominent and objective feature and (ii) the agents have strict preferences over the candidates. I introduce a notion of linear dichotomous domains to describe a class of plausible preference profiles in these social choice problems. My main result is a cha...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2782