Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy-Proofness for Hospitals in Matching Markets
Strategy-proof implementation is one of the many elements that have contributed to the successful application of matching theory in real life. However, in many-to-one matching markets without transfers (e.g., doctors to hospitals with fixed salaries) there is no stable mechanism which is strategy-proof for hospitals. Furthermore, strategy-proofness and stability cannot be achieved for both hosp...
متن کاملSingleton core in many-to-one matching problems
We study college admissions problems where unacceptable agents may exist on both sides. We explore two types of conditions for the core to be a singleton. We first consider conditions on the colleges’ preferences in problems where the sets of agents and the colleges’ capacities are arbitrarily fixed and the students’ preferences are chosen freely. We next consider conditions on the colleges’ ca...
متن کاملThe Blocking Lemma and Group Strategy-Proofness in Many-to-Many Matchings
This paper considers group strategy-proofness in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for a many-to-many matching model under quota-saturability condition and max-min preference criterion that is stranger than substitutability of preferences. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-ma...
متن کاملThe Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
This paper considers the incentive compatibility in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for many-to-many matchings under the extended max-min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-many matching problem. It is then shown that th...
متن کاملOne-to-Many Matching Auctions in Platforms
Many platforms conduct matching in settings where a one-to-many match is possible, but where a one-to-one match could produce higher revenue because participants value exclusive matches higher than shared matches. This paper studies the problem of designing a set of rules (an auction) for allocation (i.e., matching) and pricing of goods or services (e.g., a sales lead) in such settings. We requ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Design
سال: 1994
ISSN: 0928-5040,1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/bf02716633