Strategyproof facility location mechanisms on discrete trees

نویسندگان

چکیده

We address the problem of strategyproof (SP) facility location mechanisms on discrete trees. Our main result is a full characterization onto and SP mechanisms. In particular, we prove that when single agent significantly affects outcome, trajectory almost contained in agent, both move same direction along common edges. show tight relations our to previous results lines continuous then derive further implications for infinite lines.

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games

We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents’ locations to a set of facilities. The agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the distance of their true location to the nearest facility, and may misreport their location. We are interested in mechanisms that are...

متن کامل

Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks

We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategicagents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideallocation and the facility. A mechanism maps the locations reported by the agents to the location of thefacility. Specifically, we are interested in social choice mechan...

متن کامل

Strategyproof Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Hybrid and Obnoxious Facility Location Models

We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents spread on that interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who wish for the facility to be as far from them as possible, and type 2 agents, who wish for the facility to be as close to them as possible. Our goal is to maximize a form of aggregated soc...

متن کامل

Strategyproof cost-sharing Mechanisms for Set Cover and Facility Location Problems

Achieving truth-revealing, also called strategyproofness or incentive compatibility, is fundamental to game theory. The seminal work of Vickery showed a way of achieving this for single item auctions. An extension of Vickery’s idea generales the framework of auctions to the design of strategyproof mechanisms. This goes under the name of Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, and is perhaps the ...

متن کامل

Randomized Strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location and the Mini-Sum-of-Squares Objective

We consider the problem of locating a public facility on a tree, where a set of n strategic agents report their locations and a mechanism determines, either deterministically or randomly, the location of the facility. Game theoretic perspectives of the facility location problem have advanced in two main directions, one focusing on the characterization of strategyproof (SP) mechanisms and the ot...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1387-2532', '1573-7454']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-022-09592-4