STRIKES AND EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts*
We examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some goods can be reduced by making commitments that reduce flexibility. We show that such consumption commitments can induce consumers with riskneutral underlying utility functions to be risk averse over small variations in income, but sometimes to seek risk over large variations. As a result, optimal employment contracts will smooth wages c...
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This paper presents evidence on gender segregation in employment contracts in 15 EU countries, using micro data from the ECHPS. Women are over-represented in part-time jobs in all countries considered, but while in northern Europe such allocation roughly reflects women’s preferences and their need to combine work with child care, in southern Europe part-time jobs are often involuntary and provi...
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The objective of this paper is to study equilibrium in a labour market in which identical firms post wage-contracts and ex-ante identical workers search on the job. The main novelty of this paper is to generate dispersion in contract offers by allowing firms to condition their offers on workers’ initial experience and employment status although these characteristics do not affect productivity. ...
متن کاملFinancing Constraints and Fixed-Term Employment Contracts
The aim of this paper is to identify the effect of financing constraints on the employment decisions of firms. We present a theoretical model that determines the optimal use of fixed term and permanent contracts in the presence of financing constraints. We then estimate the effect of financing constraints on the dynamics of fixed-term employment contracts versus permanent employment contracts f...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Modern Law Review
سال: 1971
ISSN: 0026-7961
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.1971.tb02327.x