STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bayesian Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information
Estimation of discrete games of complete information, which have been applied to a variety of contexts such as market entry, technology adoption and peer effects, is challenging due to the presence of multiple equilibria. In this paper, we take a Bayesian MCMC approach to this problem, specifying a prior over multiple equilibrium selection mechanisms reflecting the analysts uncertainty over the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Inquiry
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0095-2583
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12189