Sub-Delegation and Circulars
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sub-delegation and trust
We investigate trust propagation in delegation situations, which often occur in hierarchical organisations and coalition structures. In doing so we define a delegation chain representing the sub-delegation process. Such delegation chains present a problem for current trust evaluation mechanisms, which are unable to accurately divide trust among the chain members, resulting in degraded system pe...
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Trust mechanisms can allow an agent to identify the most trustworthy entity to which a task should be delegated. Now this entity may further delegate the task, ultimately resulting in a delegation chain representing the sub-delegation process. Such delegation chains present a problem for current trust evaluation mechanisms, as they typically which reward or penalise a single agent rather than s...
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Reputation-based approaches allow a crowdsourcing system to identify reliable workers to whom tasks can be delegated. In crowdsourcing systems that can be modeled as multi-agent trust networks consist of resource constrained trustee agents (i.e., workers), workers may need to further sub-delegate tasks to others if they determine that they cannot complete all pending tasks before the stipulated...
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The paper addresses the issue of providing access control via delegation and constraint management across multiple security domains. Specifically, this paper proposes a novel Delegation Constraint Management model to manage and enforce delegation constraints across security domains. An algorithm to trace the authority of delegation constraints is introduced as well as an algorithm to form a del...
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We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field data on these activities, the l...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Modern Law Review
سال: 1949
ISSN: 0026-7961
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.1949.tb00108.x