Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Majoritarian Bargaining
We study three-person bargaining games with discounting, where an alternative is accepted if it is approved by a majority of players. We characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and show that for any proposal in the space of possible agreements there exists a discount factor such that given the proposal is made and accepted by one of the players in period zero. Also we constr...
متن کاملSubgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions
February 1997 Final Version: October 15, 2001 This paper provides simple four-stage game forms that fully implement a large class of two-person bargaining solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium. The solutions that can be implemented by our game forms are those that maximize a monotonic and quasi-concave function of utilities after normalizing each agent's utility function so that the maximum ...
متن کاملAlternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
The Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game is reconsidered under the assumption that each player is loss averse and the associated reference point is equal to the highest turned down offer of the opponent in the past. This makes the payoffs and therefore potential equilibrium strategies dependent on the history of play. A subgame perfect equilibrium is constructed, in which the strategie...
متن کاملAn n-Person Rubinstein Bargaining Game
When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players demand shares for themselves instead of proposing agreements to each other. Although it is possible to rul...
متن کاملCournot-Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium
In this paper, we respecify à la Cournot-Walras the mixed version of a model of noncooperative exchange, originally proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley. We first show that this respecification has a Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocation, which does not correspond to any CournotNash equilibrium of the mixed version of the original Shapley’s model. As this is due to the intrinsic two-stage nature of the...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Complexity
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1076-2787,1099-0526
DOI: 10.1155/2019/5108652