Subjective evaluations with performance feedback
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Subjective Evaluations with Performance Feedback
This paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations: their incentive role and their feedback role. The paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction, as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance. It also shows that while subjective pay is helpful, it cannot achieve full e¢ ciency. However, fully e¢ cient inc...
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Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good matches are less inclined to acce...
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Subjective Performance Evaluations and Employee Careers Firms commonly use supervisor ratings to evaluate employees when objective performance measures are unavailable. Supervisor ratings are subjective and data containing supervisor ratings typically stem from individual firm level data sets. For both these reasons, doubts persist on how useful such data are for evaluating theories in personne...
متن کاملSubjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal-agent relations
We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefiting from a real effort task in which the agents’ performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of...
متن کاملContracting with Subjective Evaluations and Communication
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal’s evaluation is private information, but she can provide some justifications by sending a costly message. Indeed, it is optimal for the principal to explain her evaluation to the agent if and only if the evaluation turns out to be bad. The justification guarantees the agent that the principal has not distorted ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12054