Successful Manipulation in Stable Marriage Model with Complete Preference Lists

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Successful Manipulation in Stable Marriage Model with Complete Preference Lists

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems

سال: 2009

ISSN: 0916-8532,1745-1361

DOI: 10.1587/transinf.e92.d.116