Sufficient Statistics for Nonlinear Tax Systems with General Across-Income Heterogeneity

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1556-5068']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4235473