Symmetry, voting, and social choice

Michael Dummett on Social Choice and Voting

Michael Dummett worked on the theoretical aspects of aggregation of individual preferences and on the strategic aspects of voting theory. He also extended Black’s analysis of single-peaked preferences for majority rule to the case of voting games (majority games), offering a greater flexibility for the expression of voters’ preferences. He is also with Donald Saari one of the major advocates of...

Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

This chapter reviews the strange history of social choice, elements of which have been understood for perhaps two thousand years. Isolated thinkers in the 13th, 15th, 18th and 19th centuries made substantial contributions to the field but almost always in ignorance of the work of their predecessors. Social choice was not established as a cumulative field of study until the middle of the 20th ce...

Voting , Arbitration , and Fair Division The mathematics of social choice

Multiwinner Voting: A New Challenge for Social Choice Theory

Social Choice and Cooperative Games: Voting Games as Social Aggregation Functions

We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the non-emptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein’s stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are ‘ordinary’ sets, finite sets and infinite sets wit...