منابع مشابه
Real interest rates, leverage, and bank risk-taking
Do low interest rate environments lead to greater bank risk-taking? We show that, when banks can adjust their capital structures, reductions in real interest rates lead to greater leverage and higher risk for any downward sloping loan demand function. However, if the capital structure is fixed, the effect depends on the degree of leverage: following a decrease in interest rates, well capitalize...
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Under the new Basel III banking regulations, a non-risk based leverage ratio will be introduced alongside the risk-based capital requirement. This move away from a solely risk-based capital framework has raised some concern of increased bank risk-taking; potentially offsetting any benefits from requiring highly leveraged banks to hold more capital. We address exactly this tradeoff between addit...
متن کاملMutual Fund Risk-Taking and Local Religious Beliefs*
Consistent with Protestants (Catholics) being more (less) risk-averse than the general population, we find that mutual funds located in regions with low Protestant (or high Catholic) population have higher total and idiosyncratic return volatilities. These higher volatilities are driven by portfolio under-diversification and aggressive interim trading, rather than overweighting risky (local) st...
متن کاملFund Flows, Performance, Managerial Career Concerns, and Risk Taking
We develop a framework in which we simultaneously model the interactions among investors, fund companies (represented by fund advisors), and managers. In this framework, we show that the interplay between a manager's incentives arising from her compensation structure and career concerns leads to a non-monotonic (approximately U-shaped) relation between her risk choices and prior performance rel...
متن کاملMutual fund tournament : Risk taking incentives induced by ranking objectives ∗
Mutual funds’ performance rankings are widely publicized in the media and have a strong impact on fund flows (see, e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998). In this paper, we study risk taking incentives of mutual fund managers who have ranking objectives (as in a tournament). First, in a two-period model, we analyze the game played by two risk-neutral fund managers with ranking objectives. We show that i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3810593