Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tacit Collusion under Interest Rate Fluctuations
When collusive agreements are illegal, oligopolies must rely on the threat of future price wars to sustain collusion. If firms’ objective is to maximize the present value of profits, the shadow of that threat changes with the interest rate. That is, the interest rate determines how much firms discount the future, and this affects the level of collusion that can be supported. In an environment o...
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We examine the economics literature on tacit collusion in oligopoly markets and take steps toward clarifying the relation between economists’ analysis of tacit collusion and those in the legal literature. We provide an example to motivate the idea that collusive profits can be achieved via tacit coordination in an environment where there is a unique, salient way for colluders to maximize and di...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0741-6261,1756-2171
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00082.x