Tactical Coordination in Plurality Electoral Systems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Oxford Review of Economic Policy
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1460-2121
DOI: 10.1093/oxrep/18.4.504