Takeover Contests, Toeholds and Deterrence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Takeover Contests , Toeholds and Deterrence ∗
We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares. The non-toeholder anticipates this extra-aggressiveness of the toeholder. Thus, he is deterred from participating...
متن کاملTakeovers, Toeholds and Deterrence *
We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover modelled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares. The non-toeholder anticipates this extra-aggressiveness of the toeholder. Thus, the non-toeholder is deterred fr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Scandinavian Journal of Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0347-0520,1467-9442
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.01556.x