Takeovers, shareholder litigation, and the free-riding problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract When shareholders of a target firm expect value improving takeover to be successful, they are individually better off not tendering their shares the buyer and potentially fails. Squeeze-out procedures can overcome this free-riding dilemma by allowing enforce payout minority seize complete control firm. However, it is often argued that shareholder litigation restores dilemma. Applying sequential game, we examine two standard legal remedies shareholders, ‘action avoidance’ judicial ‘price fairness review’ demonstrate brings back dilemma, but rather strategic gambling buyers for lower prices flaws in design application squeeze-out laws. We also analyze favorable change jurisdiction German Federal Court provide implications policy.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Review of Law and Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0144-8188', '1873-6394']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2020.105951