Taking back control: comprador bankers and managerial developmentalism in Poland
نویسندگان
چکیده
With rare exception, political economists assume that developmental policies and alliances between states business result from top-down, state co-option or coercion of business. They also do not expect the subsidiaries multinational corporations (MNCs) their local, non-expat, managers – ‘compradors’ to press for developmentalism in host countries. Based on process tracing Polish economic policy since 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), I argue that, Poland’s dependent market economy FDI-led growth regime, ‘comprador’ bankers co-opted actors into renationalizing foreign-owned banks reforming development institutions support indigenous firms’ expansion. Moreover, comprador operationalized new industrial which actors, entrepreneurs simultaneously started pressing 2010s. Comprador bankers’ motives were frustration at weak managerial autonomy foreign-headquartered MNCs concerns about negative macro-economic implications parent banks’ attempts capture subsidiaries’ excess liquidity during GFC order improve own positions.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of International Political Economy
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1466-4526', '0969-2290']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2021.1924831