Talking punishment: How victim perceptions of punishment change when they communicate with offenders

نویسندگان

چکیده

The myth that restorative justice is the opposite of retributive persists, despite a long history rhetorical challenges. Only empirical evidence can advance debate, so this article investigates relationship between punishment and victim–offender communication from victim’s perspective. Interviews with 40 victims crime established some saw as alternatives, others them independent. However, more than half participants expected communicating offender would increase their satisfaction offender’s or reported afterwards was in fact case, suggesting fulfil objectives through offender. changes occurred when received information about punishment, feedback used to impose mild own. Victims were not excessively punitive, but study demonstrates existence an association at least victims’ perspectives. This argues we should ignore attempt eliminate relationship. Rather, acknowledging examining within improve practice generate better outcomes for victims, offenders society.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Punishment & Society

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1741-3095', '1462-4745']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/14624745211054748