TARGET2 Analytical Tools for Regulatory Compliance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Shareholder Wealth Effects of MANAGEMENT Regulatory COMPLIANCE
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purpose: this paper addresses whether and how the sarbanes-oxley act of 2002(sox) affects shareholder wealth (firm value) by focusing on the trade-off between improved corporate governance leading to a lower cost of capital and increased managerial compliance costs of regulations. design/methodology: we use an analytical model of solving the management utility maximization function and the chan...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4182218