Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Implicit Quotas
Employment or admission “goals” are often preferred to affirmative action as a way of obtaining diversity. By constructing a simple model of employer-auditor interaction, I show that when an auditor has imperfect information regarding employers’ proclivities to discriminate and the fraction of qualified minorities in each employer’s applicant pool, goals are synonymous with quotas. Technically ...
متن کاملRevenue Neutral Trade Reform with Many Households, Quotas and Tariffs
Government budget balance forces the endogenous use of distortionary tax instruments when an exogenous reform is implemented. The aggregate efficiency of such reforms is based on comparisons of simple summary measures of the Marginal Cost of Funds of the various tariff or quota changes with the Marginal Cost of Funds of the alternative taxes, or of the Marginal Benefit of Government supplied go...
متن کاملTrade Reform Diagnostics with Many Households, Quotas and Tariffs*
Revenue neutral trade reform is desirable if revenues are made up from less costly distortions. With a particular Computable General Equilibrium model, reforms can be evaluated, but the robustness of conclusions is suspect; they depend on a particular specification and parameterization of the model economy. This paper provides a diagnostic toolkit which permits sensitivity analysis across model...
متن کاملPolitics of free trade areas: tariffs versus quotas
In this paper we compare and contrast the political viability of bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA) Agreements in the presence of tariffs and quotas. Assuming that the government maximizes a weighted sum of welfare and producer profits, we show that the political viability of FTAs varies according to whether trade restrictions take the form of tariffs or quotas. A key result is that whereas an FTA...
متن کاملTariffs, Quotas and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information
We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Canadian Journal of Economics
سال: 1989
ISSN: 0008-4085
DOI: 10.2307/135666