Tax evasion and government size: evidence from Italian provinces
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
value added tax and tax evasion
The phenomenon of tax evasion has been always one of the most major issues among economists due to it's devastating effects on the economy and the process of economic development. Many scholars have always sought to provide solutions to reduce and limit tax evasion. The introduction of the VAT system can be seen as a milestone in the area of economic transparency and tax evasion, which refers t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economia Politica
سال: 2021
ISSN: 1120-2890,1973-820X
DOI: 10.1007/s40888-021-00227-7