Tax preferences, dividends and lobbying for maximum value
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
value added tax and tax evasion
The phenomenon of tax evasion has been always one of the most major issues among economists due to it's devastating effects on the economy and the process of economic development. Many scholars have always sought to provide solutions to reduce and limit tax evasion. The introduction of the VAT system can be seen as a milestone in the area of economic transparency and tax evasion, which refers t...
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This study shows that individual investors prefer to invest in high dividend yield stocks and in dividendpaying firms whereas relatively lower-taxed institutional investors tend to prefer low dividend yield stocks and non-paying firms. Consistent with Brennan and Thakor’s [Brennan, M. J., & A. V. Thakor. (1990). Shareholder preferences and dividend policy. Journal of Finance, 45, 993–1018] adve...
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Blockholder ownership may increase firm value because of incentive alignment or lower it because of expropriation of minority investors. Dividend policy provides a way to distinguish between the two effects since large owners may prefer low dividends if they derive private benefits from controlling firms, while minority investors may prefer high dividends that benefit all shareholders. I examin...
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This paper offers a novel explanation for why some firms prefer to pay dividends rather than repurchase shares. It is well-known that institutional investors are relatively less taxed than individual investors, and that this induces “dividend clientele” effects. We argue that firms determine the proportions of institutional and individual owners when they set dividends. Institutions have a rela...
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This paper explores how government preferences affect the choices of capital tax rates in the presence of tax competition. We develop a model in which governments, differentiating in their preferences for economic development and regional equality, compete for mobile capital over corporation taxes. The key prediction of the model, borne out in data from OECD countries over the years 1990-2007, ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2222-3436,1015-8812
DOI: 10.4102/sajems.v20i1.1476