Teaching & Learning Guide for: ‘Border Disputes: Recent Debates along the Perception–Cognition Border’

The idea that perception is distinct from cognition not just intuitive, it central to countless debates in philosophy and psychology. For example, when researchers ask which properties can be visually represented or experienced? They are assuming there a difference between being (visual) perception, them merely post-perceptual thought cognition. Indeed, many define their careers terms of this distinction, identifying as philosophers vision scientists rather than decision theorists studying human reasoning. With these points view, prudent ask: What does the distinction actually amount to? How exactly might perception-cognition border drawn, how much indeterminacy categories should satisfactory account permit? Perhaps are, fact, borders, each perfectly objective demands recognised by completed science mind – would we know? Or perhaps notion simply confused relic pre-scientific thought, ought eliminated our scientific ontology? In main article, considered recent work seeks answer questions. Here, provide resources for teaching material. Firestone, Chaz & Scholl, Brian J. (2016). Cognition affect perception: Evaluating evidence “top-down” effects. Behavioral Brain Sciences 39:1-72. Currently, most sophisticated empirical defence claim cognitively impenetrable. (For some important precursors, see Jerry Fodor's classic [1983] Modularity Mind, MA: MIT Press, Zenon Pylyshyn's [1999] ‘Is continuous with cognition? case cognitive impenetrability visual perception’, 22(3): 366-423.) Macpherson, Fiona (2012). Cognitive Penetration Colour Experience: Rethinking Issue Light an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62. An influential argument penetrated. (Important precursors include new look psychologists, like Jerome Bruner, philosophical discussions Thomas Kuhn his [1962] Structure Scientific Revolutions Paul Churchland [1988] Perceptual plasticity theoretical neutrality: A reply Fodor, Science 55, 167-87.) Green, E. (2020). Perception–Cognition Border: Case Architectural Division. Philosophical Review 129 (3):323-393. Defends version modularity thesis compatible certain forms penetration. Block, N. (2023). Border Between Seeing Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University press. Offers sustained argues ‘constitutively’ couched non-propositional, non-conceptual, iconic format. Quilty-Dunn, Jake Pluralism. Noûs 54 (4):807-838. critique view demarcated its pictorial Clarke, Sam (2022). Mapping Visual Icon. Quarterly 72 (3):552-577. Argues more plausibly characterised non-pictorial map-like Camp, (2007). Thinking maps. Perspectives 21(1): 145-82. exemplary discussion ways various format types (appealed above disputes) differ relate. Helton, Grace (2018). Visually Perceiving Intentions Others. 68 (271):243-264. intentions others sometimes contents perception; draws on Helton's proposal marked unrevisability. Beck, Jacob Marking Boundary: Criterion Stimulus-Dependence. Australasian Journal Philosophy, 96(2), 319–334. defense stimulus dependence. Phillips, Ben (2019). Shifting Perception Cognition. 53 (2):316-346. pluralism; multiple legitimate borders mind. Clark, Andy (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, future science. 36 (3):181-204. ‘grand unified theory mind’ threatens eliminate entirely. Montague, Michelle sense/cognition distinction. Inquiry: Interdisciplinary 66(2):229-245. Kriegel, Uriah Phenomenal Intentionality Perception/Cognition Divide. Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays Honor Loar. New York: Routledge. pp. 167-183. Hume, David (1739/2000). Treatise Human Nature. Press. Dijkstra, Nadine, Bosch, S.E. van Gerven, M.A.J. Shared neural mechanisms imagery, Trends Sciences, 43(5), 423-434. Nanay, Bence implications Perky experiments: Hopkins. Analysis (3):439-443. Firestone (2015). Enhanced awareness morality pajamas? vs. memory ‘top-down’ 136: 409-16. Peters, M.A.K., Kentridge, R.W., I., (2017). Does unconscious really exist? Continuing ASSC20 debate. Neuroscience Consciousness 3(1): nix015. I. (2021). Blindsight qualitatively degraded conscious vision. Psychological 128(3):558-584. Taylor, Henry Fuzziness Mind: Can Unconscious? 101 (2):383-398. F. penetration colour experience: issue light indirect mechanism. Research. C. B. Sciences. Scholl's paper was published lots critical commentaries, reacting enthusiastic students check out. Important Scholl defend found in: (1983) Press Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). Is 366-423. If you examine Macpherson to, see: Delk, J.L. Fillenbaum, S. (1965). Differences perceived color function characteristic color. American Psychology, 78(2): 290-3. Hansen, T. et al., (2006). 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Clark Critics (Eds., Colombo, Irvine, Stapleton), folk psychological distinctions (like intuitive cognition) appropriate starting point trying understand structure mind? penetrate so, consequences modular? alternative accounts border, such those framed dependence, succeed? Should proponents expect many? enable us identify aren't We received financial support Social Humanities Council Canada Excellence Fund. USC paid make learning guide open access.