Teaching Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium to Undergraduates
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Teaching Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium to Undergraduates
The authors present a simple and effective method for improving student comprehension of mixed strategies. After reviewing available texts, and with some trial and error, we feel that this method eases the teaching of the information and increases the students’ ability to understand and retain concepts.Through a simple alteration to the normal form of a game, students can clearly see the result...
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چکیده: هدف اصلی این مطالعه ی توصیفی تحقیقی در حقیقت تلاشی پساروش-گرا به منظور رسیدن به نتیجه ای منطقی در انتخاب مناسبترین راهکار آموزشی بر گرفته از چارچوب راهبردی مطرح شده توسط والدمر مارتن بوده که به بهترین شکل سازگار و مناسب با سامانه ی آموزشی ایران باشد. از این رو، دو راهکار آموزشی، راهکار ارتباطی و راهکار بازساختی، برای تحقیق و بررسی انتخاب شدند. صریحاً اینکه، در راستای هدف اصلی این پژوهش، ر...
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A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f -optimal alternatives for all cardinal representations of the preference profile. Unlike Maskin’s definition, our definition does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure equ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Review of Economics Education
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1477-3880
DOI: 10.1016/s1477-3880(15)30088-8