Testing for collusion in asymmetric first-price auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric first price auctions
We propose a new approach to asymmetric rst price auctions which circumvents having to directly examine bidding strategies. Speci cally, the ratio of bidderspayo¤s is compared to the ratio of the distribution functions that describe beliefs. This comparison allows a number of easy inferences. In the existing theoretical literature, assumptions of rst order stochastic dominance or stronger im...
متن کاملBidder collusion at first-price auctions
We show that in simple environments, a bidding ring operating at a firstprice sealed-bid auction cannot achieve any gains relative to non-cooperative bidding if the ring is unable to control the bids that its members submit at the auction. This contrasts with results for the case in which the ring can control its members’ bids or prevent all but one of the ring members from participating in the...
متن کاملMultiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions
Maskin and Riley (Games Econ Behav 45:395–409, 2003) and Lebrun (Games Econ Behav 55:131–151, 2006) prove that the Bayes–Nash equilibrium of first-price auctions is unique. This uniqueness requires the assumption that a buyer never bids above his value (which amounts to the elimination of weakly dominated strategies). We demonstrate that, in asymmetric first-price auctions (with or without a mi...
متن کاملA Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
This paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in Florida and Texas during the 1980s. In both states firms were convicted of bid-rigging. The data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways: One cartel divides the market among members, while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from biddi...
متن کاملNumerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
Article history: Received 1 November 2009 Available online 3 March 2011 JEL classification: D44 C63 C72 D82
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.10.002