The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs

Is Majority Rule the Best Election Method?

The Price of Neutrality for the Ranked Pairs Method

The complexity of the winner determination problem has been studied for almost all common voting rules. A notable exception, possibly caused by some confusion regarding its exact definition, is the method of ranked pairs. The original version of the method, due to Tideman, yields a social preference function that is irresolute and neutral. A variant introduced subsequently uses an exogenously g...

Non-spatial Probabilistic Condorcet Election Methodology

There is a class of models for pol/mil/econ bargaining and conflict that is loosely based on the Median Voter Theorem which has been used with great success for about 30 years. However, there are fundamental mathematical limitations to these models. They apply to issues which can be represented on a single onedimensional continuum, like degree of centralization of a government, or cartel member...

A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method

In recent years, the Pirate Party of Sweden, the Wikimedia Foundation, the Debian project, the “Software in the Public Interest” project, the Gentoo project, and many other private organizations adopted a new single-winner election method for internal elections and referendums. In this paper, we will introduce this method, demonstrate that it satisfies e.g. resolvability, Condorcet, Pareto, rev...

On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies

Condorcet profiles are responsible for a number of well known preference aggregation paradoxes. It is reasonable to claim that these profiles represent complete ties between the candidates and should therefore be excluded to determine election outcomes. Established profile decomposition techniques are of limited usefulness in extracting and removing Condorcet effects, because of the computation...