The γ-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Oligopoly with Capacity Constraints and Thresholds
Abstract Extended Oligopoly models will be introduced and examined in which the firms might face capacity limits, thresholds for minimal and maximal moves, and antitrust thresholds in the case of partial cooperation. Similar situation occurs when there is an additional cost of output adjustment, which is discontinuous at zero due to set-up costs. In these cases the payoff functions of the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory and Decision
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0040-5833,1573-7187
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-011-9256-5