The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless?

Nash equilibrium of identical agents facing the Unilateralist’s Curse

This paper is an addendum to the ‘Unilateralist’s Curse’ paper of Nick Bostrom, Thomas Douglas and Anders Sandberg [BDS12]. It demonstrates that if there are identical agents facing a situation where any one of them can implement a policy unilaterally, then the best strategies they can implement are also Nash equilibriums. It also notes that if this Nash equilibrium involves probabilistic react...

Regulation of Monopoly 1

This paper reviews major contributions to positive and normative theories of monopoly regulation. Although most of the reviewed results are well known, the proof are quite di erent and more accessible. The paper also stresses the limitations of proposed regulatory mechanisms. filename: mono-p.tex 1

The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation

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Perfect Competition in a Bilateral Monopoly

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.

The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust