The Dynamic Multi-Task Supply Chain Principal-Agent Analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Dynamic Multi-Task Supply Chain Principal-Agent Analysis
In the supply chain by the composition of the supplier and the retailer, the supplier offers products to the retailer for sales while the retailer affects the sales outcome by his effort which is divided into two dimensions. One is for the short-term sales task and the other is for the long-term sales task. For the long-term development of the enterprise, the supplier wants to inspire the retai...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Service Science and Management
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1940-9893,1940-9907
DOI: 10.4236/jssm.2009.24039