The EU Leniency Programme and Recidivism

The leniency programme: obstacles on the way to collude

There is no honour among thieves. This aphorism concisely expresses why the leniency programmes in competition policy have become one of the most effective instruments in the fight against the cartels. In this work we describe the dissemination, evolution, and effects of the aforementioned programmes in the two decades since its implementation around the world, paying special attention to what ...

Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs∗

This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, thoug...

The Impact of Leniency Programs on Cartels

Antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for firms that denounce collusive agreements in which they have participated. These programs, by inducing reports on collusive agreements, allow to fine participants and can thereby eventually deter collusion. We analyze the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards on the behavior of firms. We propose the use of whistle-blowing mechanisms,...

EU Enlargement: The New Member States and Agricultural Trade Potentials

Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution

We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced ̄nes to ̄rms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give ̄rms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive e®ect, since they decrease the expected cost of misbehaviour. We analyze the optimal policy under alternative rules and with homogeneo...