THE EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE PHENOTYPE DISTRIBUTION IN A RANDOM ENVIRONMENT
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The evolutionarily stable distribution of fitness effects.
The distribution of fitness effects (DFE) of new mutations is a key parameter in determining the course of evolution. This fact has motivated extensive efforts to measure the DFE or to predict it from first principles. However, just as the DFE determines the course of evolution, the evolutionary process itself constrains the DFE. Here, we analyze a simple model of genome evolution in a constant...
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An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative (“mutant”) strategies. Unlike Nash equilibria, ESS do not always exist in finite games. In this paper we address the question of what happens when the size of the game increases: does an ESS exist for “almost every large” game? Letting the entries in the n × n game matrix be indepe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Evolution
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0014-3820,1558-5646
DOI: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.1995.tb02246.x