The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
We study infinitely repeated anonymous random matching games played by communities of players, who only observe the outcomes of their own matches. It is well known that cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium for the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) through grim trigger strategies. Little is known about games beyond the PD. We study a new equilibrium concept, strongly uniform equilibrium (SUE, which...
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A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a “dynastic” repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. These two models are in fact equivalent when the past history of play is observable to all players. In our model all players live one period and do not observe the history of play that takes...
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The Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) folk theorem for discounted repeated games assumes that the set of feasible payoffs is full dimensional. We obtain the same conclusion using a weaker condition. This condition is that no pair of players has equivalent von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over outcomes. We term this condition NEU "non-equivalent utilities". The condition is weak, easily interpreted, ...
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We study repeated games where players observe noisy private signals about the unknown state of the world in every period. We find a sufficient condition under which the folk theorem obtains by ex-post equilibria. Our condition is satisfied for generic signal distributions as long as each player has at least two possible private signals. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72...
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This paper studies repeated games with privately observed signals where it is feasible but costly to observe other players’ past actions accurately. At the end of each period, players decide the set of players to monitor by paying the corresponding observation costs. We show that the folk theorem holds for any finite stage game that satisfies the fulldimensionality condition and a minimal disti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.3982/ecta16680