The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Epistemic Logic and the Foundations of Decision and Game Theory
This paper reviews a number of foundational results at the intersection of epistemic logic, decision and game theory. It first presents a decisiontheoretic underpinning of epistemic analysis in terms of modal operators. Then it moves to the theory of strategic interaction, and show how this kind of epistemic analysis sheds light on the assumptions underlying wellknown solution concepts, both fo...
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Foundational work in game theory aims at making explicit the assumptions that underlie the basic concepts of the discipline. Non-cooperative game theory is the study of individual, rational decision making in situations of strategic interaction. This entry presents the epistemic foundations of non-cooperative game theory (this area of research is called epistemic game theory). Epistemic game th...
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This chapter provides an introduction to the so-called epistemic foundation program in game theory, whose aim is to characterize, for any game, the behavior of rational and intelligent players who know the structure of the game and the preferences of their opponents and who recognize each other’s rationality and reasoning abilities. The analysis is carried out both semantically and syntacticall...
متن کاملEpistemic Decision Theory
I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction lead...
متن کاملEpistemic decision theory
I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focussed on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mind
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0026-4423,1460-2113
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzw044