The Generality of Neutral Principles: A Game-Theoretic Perspective
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric Wargaming: Toward A Game Theoretic Perspective
As we enter the 21 century the art and practice of warfare is radically changing. The US has emerged as the dominant conventional military power only to find its adversaries working their way out of the box. The Defense Advanced Research Agency Information Systems Office (DARPA/ISO) which is seeking new approaches to asymmetric threat modeling, analysis and prediction sponsored this work as wel...
متن کاملA Game Theoretic Perspective on Network Topologies
We extend the results of Goyal and Joshi (S. Goyal and S. Joshi. Networks of collaboration in oligopoly. Games and Economic behavior, 43(1):57-85, 2003), who first considered the problem of collaboration networks of oligopolies and showed that under certain linear assumptions network collaboration produced a stable complete graph through selfish competition. We show with nonlinear cost function...
متن کاملA Game Theoretic Perspective on Business Processes
It has been recognized that in times of digitalization and rapidly changing business environments business process management will need to question and evolve its core ideas to stay innovative and relevant. Thus, the presented research project aims to synthesize existing theoretical perspectives on business processes into a novel and unified conceptualization of business processes inspired by g...
متن کاملA Game-Theoretic Perspective on Oblivious Transfer
Asharov, Canetti, and Hazay (Eurocrypt 2011) studied how game-theoretic concepts can be used to capture the cryptographic properties of correctness, privacy, and fairness in two-party protocols in the presence of fail-stop adversaries. Based on their work, we characterize the properties of “two-message” oblivious transfer protocols in terms of game-theoretic concepts. Specifically, we present a...
متن کاملCoalitional Voting Manipulation: A Game-Theoretic Perspective
Computational social choice literature has successfully studied the complexity of manipulation in various voting systems. However, the existing models of coalitional manipulation view the manipulating coalition as an exogenous input, ignoring the question of the coalition formation process. While such analysis is useful as a first approximation, a richer framework is required to model voting ma...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: California Law Review
سال: 1970
ISSN: 0008-1221
DOI: 10.2307/3479521