The given and the hard problem of content

Abstract Wilfrid Sellars’ denunciation of the Myth Given was meant to clarify, against empiricism, that perceptual episodes alone are insufficient ground and justify knowledge. Sellars showed in order accomplish such epistemic tasks, more resources capacities, as those involved using concepts, needed. Perceptual knowledge belongs space reasons not an independent realm experience. Dan Hutto Eric Myin have recently presented Hard Problem Content ensemble naturalistic accounts content. In a nutshell, it states covariance relations—even though they naturalistically acceptable explanatory resources—do constitute The authors exploit this move promote their preferred radical enactivist anti-representationalist option, according which, basic minds—the lower stratum cognition—do involve Although is controversial argue effectively dismisses theories representation, central aspect it—the idea information does suffice explain content—finds support among defenders classical cognitive representationalism, Marcin Miłkowski. This support—together with acknowledgment remark about point already made by his criticism Given—has number interesting implications. Not only interest for debates representationalism science, where can be understood anticipatory move, but also offers some clues insights reconsidering issues along Sellarsian lines—a conflation between two concepts representation often assumed distinction types relevant normativities, reconsideration naturalism explanations.