The ideal free distribution as an evolutionarily stable strategy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Biological Dynamics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1751-3758,1751-3766
DOI: 10.1080/17513750701450227