The impact of a store brand introduction in a supply chain with competing manufacturers: The strategic role of pricing and advertising decision timing

This research studies the impact of a store brand's introduction in supply chain where retailer offers national brands competing manufacturers. The focus this paper is to study such given different manufacturers' decision timing choices with regards how they set pricing and advertising decisions. We develop game-theoretic model that based on consumer utility functions represent competition between brands. then solve six games take into account choices. In particular, we consider whether manufacturers decide before, after, or at same time than pricing. Comparisons equilibrium profits for each member before after brand entry under scenario show incur losses as result retailer's when keep their unchanged. Interestingly, however, may restrain from introducing especially if decisions advertising, case fixed contracts, level sufficiently high. Further, can strategically change either benefit from, prevent restrict brand. These results provide new insights competitive interactions contractual agreements manufacturer-led chains success retailers mitigate intensify threat