The Impossibility of a Bayesian Liberal?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Aumann’s theorem states that no individual should agree to disagree under a range of assumptions. Political liberalism appears presuppose these assumptions with the idealized conditions public reason. We argue demonstrates they nevertheless cannot be simultaneously held what is arguably political liberalism’s most central tenet. That is, tenet reasonable pluralism, which implies we can rationally over conceptions good. finish by elaborating way relaxing one theorem’s axioms lends itself coherent account liberalism, namely, condition indexical independence.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Politics
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['0022-3816', '1468-2508']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/716286