The impossibility of inductive probability (reply)

On the Alleged Impossibility of Inductive Probability*

Karl Popper and David Miller [1983] have argued that there is no such thing as probabilistic inductive support, as conceived of, for example, in the Bayesian theory of evidence. A little more specifically, they argue that 'all probabilistic support is purely deductive' (p. 688), and that only probabilistic countersupport (disconfirmation) could be inductive in nature. Their interesting and stri...

The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal: Reply

The Concept of Inductive Probability

The word ‘probability’ in ordinary language has two different senses, here called inductive and physical probability. This paper examines the concept of inductive probability. Attempts to express this concept in other words are shown to be either incorrect or else trivial. In particular, inductive probability is not the same as degree of belief. It is argued that inductive probabilities exist; ...

Explication of Inductive Probability

Inductive probability is the logical concept of probability in ordinary language. It is vague but it can be explicated by defining a clear and precise concept that can serve some of the same purposes. This paper presents a general method for doing such an explication and then a particular explication due to Carnap. Common criticisms of Carnap’s inductive logic are examined; it is shown that mos...

The Authors’ Reply