The influence of corporate governance and shareholding structure on corporate social responsibility: The key role of executive compensation

This paper aims to contribute the extant literature on corporate social responsibility and governance by empirically examining effect of firm shareholding structure (and their interaction) performance. Our study is conducted within a unique context improving policies, regulations, management. In particular, we examine how practices both outside (institutional pension) inside (managerial) shareholdings impact activities. Using one largest UK data sets date, consisting FTSE 350 nonfinancial listed firms for period from 2002 2016, our results provide evidence that has positive responsibility. Institutional (indicating strong monitoring role) managerial (proxy alignment interests between insiders outsiders) are negatively associated with additional analyses empirical compensation structure, as tool, aligns management decisions toward engaging in activities strategic sustainable objectives. Additionally, suggest substitutive relationship institutional practices. There complementary influencing robust after controlling entrenched shareholding, 2SLS alternative measures The findings support Corporate Governance Code's emphasis designing effective remuneration policies