The Limits of Meritocracy in Stabilizing Democracy and the Twin Importance of Bureaucratic Impartiality and Effectiveness

Abstract Theories connecting meritocracy and democratic stability are heavily understudied, there few attempts to empirically disentangle the potential mechanisms. This article proposes a novel explanation, emphasizing that bureaucratic impartiality effectiveness provide separate shields stabilize democracies. Impartiality protects opposition from unlawful discrimination, which raises support for democracy among (potential) losers of elections reduces incentives rebel or stage coups d’état, whereas serves incumbent policies, winners likelihood takeovers. I find these propositions in comparative-historical analyses paradigmatic cases—interwar Finland, Czechoslovakia, Germany—with similar levels economic development, imperial-autocratic legacies, meritocratic types administration but different regime outcomes. The results show both impartial effective behavior rather than recruitment norms as such important stabilizers democracy. Yet they emphasize importance raising perception votes count change outcomes on ground thus makes difference. argue this should have wider significance study contemporary processes recession.