The Logic of Collective Bargaining and Arbitration

Arbitration and Bargaining Across the Pacific

s This paper reports laboratory experiments comparing arbitration behavior between and across two developed countries with extensive trade relations, the United States and Japan. Besides comparing domestic disputes in both locations, we evaluate disputes between the two countries. While we find nominal differences between the US and Japan, we observe significant changes in both cultures when fa...

Bargaining with split-the-difference arbitration

We analyze an alternating-offer model in which an arbitrator uses the splitthe-difference arbitration rule to determine the outcome if both players’ offers are rejected by the opponents. We find that the usual chilling effect of split-the-difference arbitration only arises when the discount factor is sufficiently large. When the discount factor is sufficiently small, players tend to reach agree...

Bargaining with Asymmetric Uncertainty: Arbitration Mechanisms Compared

An arbitration game and the egalitarian bargaining solution

We analyze a simple arbitration procedure which is a multi-stage variant of Nash's demand game. In the absence of discounting, all Nash equilibria of the game yield the egalitarian solution in the first stage. The crucial feature of our arbitration procedure is that, in the case of incompatible demands, the game is allowed to continue and the player who demands the higher gain over the disagree...

The Logic of Bargaining

This paper reexamines the game-theoretic bargaining theory from logic and Artificial Intelligence perspectives. We present an axiomatic characterization of the logical solutions to bargaining problems. A bargaining situation is described in propositional logic with numerical representation of bargainers’ preferences. A solution to the n-person bargaining problems is proposed based on the maxmin...