The Lottery Paradox Generalized?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Lottery Paradox Generalized?
In a recent article, Douven and Williamson offer both (i) a rebuttal of various recent suggested sufficient conditions for rational acceptability and (ii) an alleged ‘generalization’ of this rebuttal, which, they claim, tells against a much broader class of potential suggestions. However, not only is the result mentioned in (ii) not a generalization of the findings referred to in (i), but in co...
متن کاملGeneralizing the Lottery Paradox
This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presents an argument showing that these solutions are trivial in that they boil down to the claim that perfect probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The argument is then generalized, showing ...
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List and Pettit have stated an impossibility theorem about the aggregation of individual opinion states. Building on recent work on the lottery paradox, this paper offers a variation on that result. The present result places different constraints on the voting agenda and the domain of profiles, but it covers a larger class of voting rules, which need not satisfy the proposition-wise independence
متن کاملWhat the Lottery Paradox Tells Us About Default Reasoning
In this paper I argue that we do not under stand the process of default reasoning A number of examples are given which serve to distinguish di erent default reasoning sys tems It is shown that if we do not make our assumptions explicit we get into trouble with disjunctive knowledge and if we make our assumptions explicit we run foul of the lottery paradox None of the current popular default rea...
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Many epistemologists have responded to the lottery paradox by proposing formal rules according to which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson (2006) present an ingenious argument purporting to show that such rules invariably trivialise, in that they reduce to the claim that a probability of 1 warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson’s argument does, however, r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0007-0882,1464-3537
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axp056