The Nash bargaining solution vs. equilibrium in a reinsurance syndicate
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Syndicate; Existence, Uniqueness and Characterization
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Scandinavian Actuarial Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0346-1238,1651-2030
DOI: 10.1080/03461230802425834