THE PROBLEM OF THE CATEGORIAL IN THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION: HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

The article aims to show that the task of grounding categorial constituents in specific founded acts perception yields problem field phenomenological inquiry, within framework which remains Heidegger’s project fundamental ontology. To achieve this goal reconstructs, first, possibility a priori correspondence between meaning and intuition intentional act; second, justification extension traditional concept truth, as result truth characteristic expands structured certain way, namely total agreement (identification acts); third, “categorial” analysis perception, includes limited transcendental philosophy area sensible intuitions, acts. On basis, demonstrates (1) phenomenology sense continues philosophy, but idea notion structural intentionality forms new research problem. (2) understanding terms dynamics empty filled intention is significant for presented by Heidegger Being Time. explicates ontology based on identification. (3) object its constitution justified Husserl provides with subject. interprets categories, phenomenally represented intuition, structures being beings. study also ascertains concepts Husserl’s saturate conceptual However, rethinks key accordance objectives are different from original designed Husserl.