The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Generalized monotonicity and strategy−proofness: A note
In this note we define generalized monotonicity which is a generalized version of monotonicity due to Muller and Satterthwaite (1979) for a social choice function under individual preferences which permit indifference, and shall show that generalized monotonicity and strategy−proofness are equivalent. I would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta and the anonymous referee for helpful comments. Citation: ...
متن کاملMonotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness for Correspondences
We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite's (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the resul...
متن کاملCoalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
This paper studies (single-valued) solutions to housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. I show that a solution is monotonic if and only if it is coalition strategy-proof. I point out that the strong core solution is the only solution which is monotonic, individually rational and an onto function. (As Roth and Postlewaite (1977) showed, the strong core solution is sing...
متن کاملthe relationship between l2 learning strategy use and motivation among iranian efl learners
راهکاهای یادگیری که تحت عنوان "اعمال و رفتارهایی که توسط زبان آموزان بکار برده می شود جهت یادگیری موفق تر، هدفمندتر و جذاب تر زبان" (آکسفورد، 1989) تعریف شده است، نقش قابل توجهی در یادگیری زبان خارجی ایفا می کند. در مطالعات اخیر تأثیر عوامل مختلفی مانند سن، جنسیت، سطح بسندگی، فرهنگ، انگیزه، نوع نگرش، ویژگی های شخصیتی و... در استفاده و انتخاب راهکارهای یادگیری زبان بررسی شده است. در میان عوامل ب...
15 صفحه اولGeneralized monotonicity and strategy−proofness for non−resolute social choice correspondences
Recently there are several works which analyzed the strategy−proofness of non−resolute social choice rules such as Duggan and Schwartz (2000) and Ching and Zhou (2001). In these analyses it was assumed that individual preferences are linear, that is, they excluded indifference from individual preferences. We present an analysis of the strategy−proofness of non−resolute social choice rules when ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0586-6