The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle – what we term the “delegation principle” – can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria. JEL Classification: D82, L51.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345